New California Case–Trustee Cannot Condition Payment of Distribution on Release of Claims, Bellows v. Bellows

Bellow v. Bellows (California Court of Appeal, First District, A128875, June 9, 2011)

Summary: A trustee cannot compel a beneficiary to condition the payment of a distribution on the release of other claims or demands of the trust beneficiary; and probate code §854 does not operate to abate an action filed under §17200.

June 10, 2011
David Tate, Esq. (San Francisco), http://davidtate.us
Tate’s Blog: Law – Governance – Risk – Business, http://davidtate.wordpress.com
California Estate & Trust Litigation, https://californiaestatetrust.wordpress.com
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Beverly Bellows established the Beverly Bellows trust, naming her and her son Frederick as the co-trustees. The trust provided that on her death, the trust assets would be divided equally between her two sons Frederick and Donald. Following Beverly’s death in 2008, Donald requested distribution of his share of the trust. When the distribution was not made, Donald filed a petition in the probate court pursuant to section 17200 seeking an accounting and distribution of the trust assets. In its November 2009 order court ordered Frederick to provide an accounting of the trust assets and to distribute one-half of the assets to Donald within 10 days.

On November 27, Frederick mailed Donald’s attorney a check for $30,376.80, which he represented was one-half of the trust assets. Accompanying the check was a document entitled “Final Trust Accounting,” showing the total trust assets as of Beverly’s death in December 2008 and income and expenses since that date. Donald returned the check with a letter claiming that the amount was insufficient because Frederick had improperly deducted from the remaining corpus of the trust approximately $13,000 of his own attorney fees prior to dividing the trust assets in half. The Donald stated that if the deduction was not deleted from the accounting and a new check issued within five days, he would file an objection to the accounting. Donald also requested documentation regarding a trust account that he believed contained $12,000 that was omitted from the accounting.

Frederick offered “to give Donald one-half of the fees actually paid by [the] trust, i.e., $6,718.25, provided there is no petition forthcoming soon. . . .” Frederick forwarded a check to Donald for $37,520.48, together with a letter advising that Donald is “authorized to negotiate the check when he has signed and returned the enclosed receipt of final distribution.” The receipt included an acknowledgment that the payment represented “a final distribution of the trust estate.” Donald cashed the check, but did not sign and return the receipt.

Donald then filed a motion to compel compliance with the court’s November 2009 order. Donald sought an order “compelling trustee Frederick Bellows to provide a full and complete accounting within ten (10) days, including sufficient documentation reflecting the activity on all sums in the original Beverly Bellows trust from June 2003 through her death in 2008 and until final distribution in November 2009” and that “a check be provided to Donald Bellows and his attorney within ten (10) days for one-half of any additions to the trust corpus not previously accounted for.”

Frederick opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for abatement and for attorney fees and sanctions. Frederick argued that the motion for a further accounting should be denied because Donald had cashed the check in full satisfaction of his claim for half the trust assets. He contended that the action should also be abated because Donald’s claims with respect to his management of the trust, while Beverly was alive, were pending in a civil action that Donald had filed against him in September 2009.

The trial court found that by negotiating the check presented by Frederick, “Don agreed to the terms under which it was tendered, that is to say that Donald agreed that it was a final distribution of all assets of the trust and that Donald thereby effected an accord and satisfaction of all obligations that Fredrick owed under [the trust].” The court noted that “although it appears that Fredrick fully complied with this court’s order of November 13, 2009, . . . it is not necessary to make that finding in light of the accord and satisfaction referred to above.” The court awarded Frederick his attorney fees “for bringing this motion after accepting the accord and satisfaction referred to above.” The court also found pursuant to section 854 that the present action should be abated in favor of the civil action filed in September 2009. Donald appealed.

On appeal the appellate court held that the requirements for an accord and satisfaction based on acceptance of a negotiable instrument are governed by Commercial Code section 3311. “To obtain an accord and satisfaction under Commercial Code section 3311, a debtor must prove that: ‘(1) [the debtor] in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument… .’ [Citation.] If the debtor further proves that he accompanied the tender with a conspicuous statement that the amount was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim, and if the claimant does not prove that he tendered repayment of the amount within 90 days, the debt is discharged.” Donald argued that Probate code section 16004.5 overrides Commercial Code section 3311, and precludes the entry of an effective accord and satisfaction under the present circumstances. Section 16004.5, subdivision (a) provides that “A trustee may not require a beneficiary to relieve the trustee of liability as a condition for making a distribution or payment to, or for the benefit of, the beneficiary, if the distribution or payment is required by the trust instrument.” Subdivision (b) adds, “This section may not be construed as affecting the trustee’s right to: [¶]… [¶] (2) Seek a voluntary release or discharge of a trustee’s liability from the beneficiary. [¶]… [¶] (4) Withhold any portion of an otherwise required distribution that is reasonably in dispute. [¶] (5) Seek court or beneficiary approval of an accounting of trust activities.”

The appellate court held that section 16004.5 was the applicable authority. Frederick could not condition the payment on a release of liability. Frederick, as trustee, was required to make this distribution to Donald without any strings attached. He was not entitled to condition the payment on the release of other claims or demands of the trust beneficiary. “Subdivision (b)(5) permits a trustee to seek beneficiary approval of an accounting of trust activities; under this subdivision Frederick presumably could enter an agreement with Donald to resolve the attorney fee issue by distributing to Donald an agreed amount. However, Frederick could not condition such an agreement on Donald releasing his right to an accounting or of other claims he might have against the trustee. Again, such an interpretation would render subdivision (a) nugatory.” “The court below thus erred in holding that Donald’s acceptance of the check prevented him from challenging the accuracy of the accounting submitted by Frederick, as trustee.”

The appellate court also addressed the abatement issue as the trial court’s order also abated the probate action under probate codes section 854 in favor of the previously filed civil complaint. The civil action alleged causes of action for financial elder abuse, constructive fraud, undue influence, negligence, and infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that in 2002 Beverly inherited a substantial estate from her brother and that Frederick, acting as trustee of his uncle’s estate, improperly diverted the proceeds of that estate from Beverly’s trust into a “Pay-on-Death” account for which he was the only beneficiary. The complaint also alleged that in approximately June of 2003, the Beverly Bellows Trust was funded with approximately $130,000 in fixed income assets and that “[t]hese sums have never appeared in any trust accounting provided by trustee Fred Bellows and the total amount of funding placed in the trust fund by Fred appears to total $55,000 only.” The complaint suggests that Frederick concealed his mother’s inheritance from his mother and used funds from the Beverly Bellows trust to pay Beverly’s living expenses in order to enrich his inheritance.

Section 854 is entitled “Conveyance or Transfer of Property Claimed to Belong to Decedent or Other Person.” In relevant part, section 854 provides, “If a civil action is pending with respect to the subject matter of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter and jurisdiction has been obtained in the court where the civil action is pending prior to the filing of the petition, upon request of any party to the civil action, the court shall abate the petition until the conclusion of the civil action.”  The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that section 854 must be understood to be in reference to any petition filed pursuant to part 19, in which section 854 appears—section 854 is not applicable because Donald’s petition was not filed under a section within part 19, but under section 17200 which appears in chapter 3 of part 5 of division 9 of the Probate Code. Section 17200 authorizes a “beneficiary of a trust [to] petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust” including compelling the trustee to provide an accounting. (§ 17200, subds. (a), (b)(7)(C).)

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David Tate, Esq. (San Francisco and throughout California)

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Fremont Bank June 2011 Estate Attorneys E-Newsletter

A good read for estate related news, Fremont Bank June 2011 Estate Attorneys E-Newsletter,

Fremont Bank June 2011 Estate Attorneys E-Newsletter

MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse June 2011

MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse June 2011

MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse June 2011

http://www.metlife.com/mmi/research/elder-financial-abuse.html?WT.ac=PRO_Pro#key findings . . .

Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees after Statutory 998 Settlement Offer

David Tate, Esq. (San Francisco)

https://californiaestatetrust.wordpress.com

http://davidtate.us

Re: Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees after Statutory 998 Settlement Offer

Martinez v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, B221234, May 23, 2011)

I don’t see statutory Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §998 settlement offers very often in trust, estate and probate court proceedings, but they are very common in civil litigation and should be considered more often in trust, estate and probate court proceedings.  A 998 offer is a binding limited offer to settle the case on the terms provided in the offer.  If the offer is not accepted within the time allowed, the offer can operate to shift the recovery or payment of costs, including attorneys’ fees.  I have copied and pasted below the primary relevant wording from section 998 regarding the shifting of costs.

Care needs to be exercised in wording the section 998 offer, considering all aspects of settlement if the offer is accepted, and cost shifting in terms of likely trial results if the offer is not accepted.  In Martinez v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”) a monetary 998 offer was made by Defendant MTA which in relevant part stated that each side was to “bear their own costs.”  Plaintiff accepted the offer settling the case.  Claiming it was the prevailing party based on the settlement terms, Plaintiff then filed a motion for recovery of attorneys’ fees under the federal and California disabilities statutes.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that where a §998 offer is silent as to both costs and attorney fees, the prevailing party was entitled to both, but as in this case, where the offer specifically excludes costs but does not mention attorney fees, unless the offer expressly states otherwise, an offer of a monetary compromise under §998 that excludes “costs” also excludes attorney fees.

The primary relevant wording from Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §998 relating to the shifting of costs:

(c)(1) If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer. In addition, in any action or proceeding other than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the plaintiff to pay a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the defendant.

(d) If an offer made by a plaintiff is not accepted and the defendant fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award in any action or proceeding other than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the defendant to pay a reasonable sum to cover postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the plaintiff, in addition to plaintiff’s costs.

Nonprofit Board Standard of Care, Risk Management and Audit Committee Responsibilities

Nonprofit Board Standard of Care, Risk Management and Audit Committee Responsibilities paper updated May 19, 2011,

http://davidtate.us/files/Nonprofit_Board_Standard_of_Care_Risk_Management_and_Audit_Committee_Responsibilities_David_Tate_Esq_05192011.pdf

Discussion: evaluating dysthymic disorders in litigation

You might be interested, the following is a link to a discussion by Dr. Leckart about the evaluation of dysthymic disorders in litigation. 

http://socal.medlegalfirst.com/newsletter/270-wetc-vol1-no28

Fremont Bank Estate Attorneys E-Newsletter–Good/Useful Information

The following is a link to the Fremont Bank Wealth Management Estate Attorneys E-Newsletter for May 2011.  A tremendous amount of useful information about new developments and cases.  Fremont Bank Estate Attorneys E-Newsletter May 2011

Diaz/Bukey–arbitration clause not enforceable against non-settlor beneficiary

Diaz v. Bukey (California Court of Appeal, Second District, 5/10/2011, B225548)

Arbitration clause provision in a trust not enforceable against a non-settlor beneficiary who objects to the clause.

Daniel and Marie Diaz established the Diaz Family Trust. On November 1, 2004, appellant Marie L. Bukey was appointed successor trustee of the Trust. Bukey and respondent Paulette D. Diaz are sisters and beneficiaries of the Trust. The Trust became irrevocable upon the death of the surviving settlor, Marie Diaz, on November 6, 2006.

On May 8, 2009, Diaz’s attorney made a written request that Bukey provide an accounting of the financial activities of the Trust during her tenure as trustee. The accounting Bukey provided was not satisfactory to Diaz. On November 5, 2009, Diaz filed a petition for order removing trustee, appointing successor trustee, and compelling trustee to account and reimburse Trust pursuant to Probate Code section 17200. The petition alleged that Bukey breached her fiduciary duties by failing to provide a proper accounting, failing to distribute the assets of the Trust, and using Trust assets for her personal benefit.

In response, Bukey filed a demurrer and a petition for order compelling arbitration and stay of proceedings. The petition asserted that an arbitration provision contained in the Trust required that Diaz’s claims be settled by binding arbitration.

The arbitration provision states: “Any dispute arising in connection with this Trust, including disputes between Trustee and any beneficiary or among Co-Trustees, shall be settled by the negotiation, mediation and arbitration provisions of that certain LawForms Integrity Agreement (Uniform Agreement Establishing Procedures for Settling Disputes) entered into by the parties prior to, concurrently with or subsequent to the execution of this Trust. In the event that the parties have not entered into a LawForms Integrity Agreement (Uniform Agreement Establishing Procedures for Settling Disputes), then disputes in connection with this Trust shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Any decision rendered either in accordance with the LawForms Integrity Agreement (Uniform Agreement Establishing Procedures for Settling Disputes) or the rules of the American Arbitration Association shall be binding upon the parties as if the decision had been rendered by a court having proper jurisdiction.”

Diaz opposed the demurrer and petition to arbitrate. The trial court issued its order overruling the demurrer and denying the petition to compel arbitration.  Bukey appealed.

On appeal, the Court affirmed that although Diaz was a beneficiary of the trust, Bukey could not enforce the trust’s arbitration clause against Diaz because Diaz objected to arbitration and Diaz was not a signatory to the arbitration clause.

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David Tate, Esq., San Francisco, http://davidtate.us.

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Corporate Voting By Trustees, Article Link

The following is a link to a discussion about the requirements of corporate voting by trustees, look for the April 27, 2011 article,

http://www.calcorporatelaw.com/

Risk Appetite & Risk Tolerance

The following is a link to a short, worthwhile discussion by Norman Marks about the difference between risk appetite and risk tolerance:

http://normanmarks.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/just-what-is-risk-appetite-and-how-does-it-differ-from-risk-tolerance/

The following is Norman’s post–I thought it could be of interest to trustees and trust investment advisors:

Just what is risk appetite and how does it differ from risk tolerance?

April 14, 2011 Norman Marks 6 comments

How can we have a productive conversation about risk management unless we use the same language? One of the terms that serves as much to confuse as clarify is “risk appetite’. What does it mean, and how does it differ from risk tolerance?

Let’s look first at the COSO ERM Framework. It defines risk appetite as “the amount of risk, on a broad level, an organization is willing to accept in pursuit of stakeholder value.” In their Strengthening Enterprise Risk Management for Strategic Advantage, COSO says:

“An entity should also consider its risk tolerances, which are levels of variation the entity is willing to accept around specific objectives. Frequently, the terms risk appetite and risk tolerance are used interchangeably, although they represent related, but different concepts. Risk appetite is a broadbased description of the desired level of risk that an entity will take in pursuit of its mission. Risk tolerance reflects the acceptable variation in outcomes related to specific performance measures linked to objectives the entity seeks to achieve.”

They continue:

“So to determine risk tolerances, an entity needs to look at outcome measures of its key objectives, such as revenue growth, market share, customer satisfaction, or earnings per share, and consider what range of outcomes above and below the target would be acceptable. For example, an entity that has set a target of a customer satisfaction rating of 90% may tolerate a range of outcomes between 88% and 95%. This entity would not have an appetite for risks that could put its performance levels below 88%.”

Does this work? To a degree, perhaps. The way I look at it, risk appetite or tolerance are devices I use to determine whether the risk level is acceptable or not. I want to make sure I take enough, as well as ensure I am not taking too much. This is all within the context of achieving the organization’s objectives.

In other words, these are risk criteria: criteria for assessing whether the risk level is OK or not. Before progressing to see how ISO 31000 tackles the topic, I want to stop and see what one of the major auditing/consulting organizations has to say.

Ernst & Young has an interesting perspective, which they explain in Risk Appetite: the strategic balancing act. In the referenced PDF version, they include definitions of multiple terms:

  • Risk capacity: the amount and type of risk an organization is able to support in pursuit of its business objectives.
  • Risk appetite: the amount and type of risk an organization is willing to accept in pursuit of its business objectives.
  • Risk tolerance: the specific maximum risk that an organization is willing to take regarding each relevant risk.
  • Risk target: the optimal level of risk that an organization wants to take in pursuit of a specific business goal.
  • Risk limit: thresholds to monitor that actual risk exposure does not deviate too much from the risk target and stays within an organization’s risk tolerance/risk appetite. Exceeding risk limits will typically act as a trigger for management action.

There are similarities to the COSO ERM definitions, with both using appetite for the organization’s overall acceptable level of risk, and tolerance to describe risk at a lower, more granular level. Personally, I find the EY examples and usage a little better than the COSO one – the idea of a variance from objectives is not appealing and I am not confident it is very practical.

Coming back to the idea of risk criteria. One common practice is for risk managers (and consultants, vendors, etc) to talk about risk as being high, medium, low, etc; another is to quantify it in some way, often in monetary terms. (Just think of a typical heat map.) But, just because a risk is considered “high” doesn’t necessarily mean that it is too high. Similarly, just because a risk is “low” doesn’t mean that the risk level is desirable.

Think about somebody in one of the Libyan cities being shelled this week. They are considering whether to stay or leave the city, and then whether to go to family in Tripoli or try to get across the border into Egypt. All of the options, including doing nothing, are high risk – but they need to take one.

Maybe that is an extreme example. COSO talks about balancing risk and reward, and the notion that you need to take risks – even high ones – in order to obtain rewards. An example of this could be a decision to enter a new market. The risks may be high, but the rewards justify taking them.

Exploring that example a little more, there may be several options for entering the market: slowly dipping the toe in, going full blast, or partnering with a company that already has a major presence. If you just look at the level of risk without considering the rewards that can be obtained from each option, you may make a poor decision.

Where am I going? To assess whether a risk level is acceptable or not, it is not enough to say it is high, medium, $5 million, etc. You have to say whether it is acceptable given the potential rewards by reference to your risk criteria. This is where, for me, appetite and tolerance play – and risk target, as explained by EY.

So, to ISO. Here are a few definitions from ISO Guide 73, Risk Management – Vocabulary.

  • Risk attitude: organization’s approach to assess and eventually pursue, retain, take or turn away from risk
  • Level of risk: magnitude of a risk or combination of risks, expressed in terms of the combination of consequences and their likelihood
  • Risk criteria: terms of reference against which the significance of a risk is evaluated
  • Risk evaluation: process of comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria to determine whether the risk and/or its magnitude is acceptable or tolerable
  • Risk appetite: amount and type of risk that an organization is willing to pursue or retain
  • Risk tolerance: organization’s or stakeholder’s readiness to bear the risk after risk treatment in order to achieve its objectives

It is worth noting that the ISO 31000:2009 standard doesn’t use all these terms. Rather than getting into a detailed discussion around risk appetite and tolerance, the standard says you should establish risk criteria and then evaluate risks against those criteria to determine which risks need treatment.

Frankly, I would prefer more detailed guidance on this, as the decision on how much risk to take is the key to effective risk management. But, we will have to wait for more practical guidance from ISO and its national organizations.

Here’s my view. I like and use the ISO definitions (from Publication 73) I listed above. Companies have to take risk to make a profit, or deliver value to their stakeholders. They level of risk they pursue is their appetite for risk. But they may be able to tolerate, or absorb, a different level of risk without significant pain and impact on achieving their strategic objectives. This is their tolerance.

A colleague with IIA Canada, Eric Lavoie, shared with me a model he has used with one of his financial services clients. My representation is shown below.


Risk appetite is represented by a range. When risk levels fall outside that range, performance is sub-optimal. When risk levels exceed the organization’s risk tolerance, it becomes more critical to take action.

So, what is your opinion? What do these terms mean in your language?

Other references:

Food for Thought on Risk Appetite

A discussion of Risk Appetite by thought leaders

Understanding and articulating risk appetite (KPMG)